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THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT. By Norval Morris. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 1974. Pp. xiv, 144. $6.95. 
· "Prison is, in practice, the ultimate power the democratic state 
exercises over a citizen,1 yet we lack a jurisprudence of imprison-
ment" (p. ix). Professor Norval Morris' The Future of Imprisonment 
is a bold attempt to fill this jurisprudential void.2 Undaunted by 
the expectation that he "will be attacked from the right as too per-
missive and idealistic and from the left as too punitive and oppor-
tunistic," (p. 2) Professor Morris has embarked on a "search . . . 
for a new model of imprisonment that provides for the legitimate 
exercise of society's power over the convicted criminal and protects 
fundamental principles of justice. It is a jurisprudential model rather 
than an operational model; the discussion is more of the forces that 
shape the prison than of the operation of the prison community, 
though the two are, of course, intertwined" (p. x). 
Despite these claims by the author, the book is not mainly one 
of jurisprudence in the traditional sense. It is not primarily "an 
investigation of an abstract, general and theoretical nature which 
seeks to lay bare the essential principles of law and legal systems."3 
Quite the contrary, Professor Morris deals not only in the abstract, 
general, and theoretical, but also in the concrete, specific, and prac-
tical.4 The result is a contribution not only to traditional juris-
prudence, but to what has often been called realist jurisprudence5 
as well. This bifurcated contribution is an outgrowth of the two 
distinct themes treated in the book: the structuring of imprison-
ment and the justification of imprisonment. 
I. Excluding, of course, "the anachronism of capital punishment [that] persists in 
some places as a rarely invoked return to barbarism" (p. 2). 
2. Professor Morris' despair over the lack of a jurisprudence of imprisonment is 
a reflection of the despair felt by many scholars over the lack of a jurisprudence of 
sanctions in general: "Despite the presumed importance of sanctions in the legal 
process, ••• serious attention has rarely been paid to the topic." Schwartz &: Orleans, 
On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 274, at 274 (1967). Nevertheless, as Schwartz 
and Orleans point out, there have been a few "[n]otable efforts to deal systematically 
with the topic [that] range from BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCll'LES OF 
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1823), to CARLSTON, LAW AND ORGANIZATION IN WORLD SoCIETY 
(1962)." Id. at 274 n.2. Other such efforts include H. PACK.ER, THE LIMITS OF THE 
CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968) (especially pp. 23-34); and Griffiths' response, The Limits 
of Criminal Law Scholarship, 79 YALE L.J. 1393 (1970). 
3. SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 1 (12th ed. P.J. Fitzgerald 1966). 
4. Thus, Professor Morris' justification for his work has little to do with whether 
there ought to be prisons. Rather, he has stated, "I am confirmed in persevering in 
this foolhardy effort ••• by what seem to me ••• obvious realities. First, the prison 
shows no sign of disappearing anywhere in the world" (p. 12). 
5. CJ. H. KALVEN &: H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 11 (1966). 
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I. THE STRUCTURING OF IMPRISONMENT 
Convinced that the practice of imprisonment will persist, that 
it will play an important societal role for generations to come, that 
its present administration leaves much to be desired, and that other 
reformers have little to offer, 6 Professor Morris has suggested re-
forms for the administration of imprisonment that he believes will 
preserve its proper purposes-deterrence and retribution-while 
concomitantly increasing the effectiveness of rehabilitative programs.7 
The essential features of these proposed reforms can be briefly sum-
marized: First, participation in rehabilitative programs must be 
made completely voluntary, or, as Professor Morris puts it, there 
must be "substitution of facilitated change for coerced cure" (p. 27; 
emphasis original); and, second, offenders must be given increasing 
increments of freedom to test their ability to function in society. 
6. "They may sometimes concur on what is wrong but they lack the inner compass 
of shared principles to chart a path to other than ameliorative change. There is a 
fervor and factionalism, a modishness, in their recommendations that seriously im-
pede correctional reform" (pp. 1-2). Professor Morris' opinion is difficult to evaluate 
as the only antecedent of "they" is the word "reformers." He gives no citations 
and thus leaves us to speculate who these modish, impassioned impediments to cor-
rectional reform are. He may, of course, be including everyone but himself, If so, 
the wisdom of his evaluation is open to question. The most likely explanation of 
this passage, however, is that the wisdom of it was not intended to be scrutinized. 
Thus, to borrow Harry Kalven's description of Justice Holmes' performance in Duck 
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), this passage "may in the end survive as a monument 
only to the wit but not the wisdom" of Professor Morris. Kalven, A Special Comer 
of Civil Liberties: A Legal View, 31 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1223, 1234 (1956), 
7. Ironically, Professor Morris desires to increase the rehabilitative effects of CO• 
ercive state intervention notwithstanding his conclusion that, unlike deterrence and 
retribution, rehabilitation is not a proper penal purpose. He says: 
"Rehabilitation," whatever it means and whatever the programs that allegedly 
give it meaning, must cease to be a purpose of the prison sanction, This does not 
mean that the various developed treatment programs within prisons need to be 
abandoned; quite the contrary, they need expansion. Dut it does mean that they 
must not be seen as purposive in the sense that criminals are to be sent to prison 
for treatment. There is a sharp distinction between the purposes of incarceration 
and the opportunities for the training and assistance of prisoners that may be 
pursued within those purposes. 
(Pp. 14-15; emphasis original.) 
Professor Morris rejects rehabilitation as a proper purpose of the criminal justice 
system because he fears the abuse that might result if the substantive criminal law 
moves away from outright prohibition toward administrative regulation, and if the 
practice of diverting people from the traditional processes of the system to rehabili-
tative programs continues: 
The present danger is that the regulatory and licensing techniques that will 
supplant the overreaching criminal law in the areas of complaintless crimes, and 
the diversionary techniques that will protect offenders from the greater rigors of 
imprisonment, may lead to a substantial extension of social control by official 
state processes rather than to a reduction. We face a difficult trade-off. We risk 
substituting more pervasive but less punitive control mechanisms over a vastly 
larger number of citizens for our present discriminatory and irrational selection 
of fewer citizens for more punitive and draconian punishments. 
(P. IO). Although his fear of pre-trial diversion may be justified, I doubt that t11ere 
will be any immediate drastic reduction in the pervasiveness of the substantive crim• 
inal law. As Thurman Arnold said of much of the law constituting the overreach, 
it is "unenforced because we want to continue our conduct, and unrepealed because 
we want to preserve our morals.'' T • .ARNOLD, SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 160 (1930), 
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With regard to his first point, Professor Morris has come to be-
lieve that the promises of coerced rehabilitation-the medical model 
of treatment-are empty, since we lack the ability either to diagnose 
or to cure the "disease" of criminality.8 He ascribes the failure of di-
agnosis to the fact that "[p ]rison behavior is not a predictor of com-
munity behavior" (p. 16).9 Similarly, the failure to effect cures is 
said to be due to the inability to coerce psychological change, a point 
on which few disagree. As James Coleman has expressed it: "Some 
degree of cooperation on the part of the individual receiving help 
is considered essential if psychotherapy is to have much chance of 
success."10 
Although Professor Morris is probably correct in assuming that 
coerced psychotherapy is generally ineffective, he does not limit his 
criticism to psychologically oriented programs. Instead, he groups 
all rehabilitative programs together-educational, vocational, and 
psychological-and rejects them all if participation is coerced (pp. 
17-20). It is not self-evident that all nonvoluntary programs should 
be condemned, however. For example, employment is one of the 
three factors11 known to be positively correlated with success on 
release. Thus, if job skills can be coercively imparted, the possibility 
exists of effecting some "cures" through coerced rehabilitative pro-
grams. Of course, the issue is by no means a simple one. The presence 
of job skills neither guarantees the presence of a job, ]].Or assures 
the presence of an attitude that will utilize those skills upon release. 
Moreover, while it is likely that more offenders could be coerced 
into participation in vocational programs than would volunteer, how 
well those coerced would learn, and the effect of coercion on the 
attitude of those who would have volunteered, remain to be deter-
mined. Until these questions are answered by empiricism, not 
rhetoric, the wisdom of Professor Morris' position will remain in 
doubt.12 
8. Professor Morris was not the first to have reached this conclusion. See, e.g., 
J. Andenaes' collection of his own works, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1974), espe-
cially ch. VI, "The Future of Criminal Law." 
9. This has long been believed. See, e.g., J. DEVON, THE CRIMINAL AND THE COM-
MUNITY 6 (1912) ("The study of the criminal has mainly been based on observation 
and examination of persons in prison; but in prison the criminal is not himself''). 
IO. J. COLEMAN, .ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE 663 (4th ed. 1972). See 
also H. PACKER, supra note 2, at 256. A point mentioned (p. 80), though largely un-
discussed by Professor Morris, is that even if we could "diagnose and cure" it is not 
at all clear that we would go to the expense of doing so. Cf. Cohen, Moral Aspects 
of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 1012-14 (1940). 
11. The others are aging and the existence of a supportive social group. 
12. Professor Morris seems to realize this, just as he seems to recognize the rela-
tionship (or lack of relationship) between job skills and jobs. (See pp. 15-16). Thus, 
his "lumping" is all the more curious. Perhaps it can be explained by what appears 
to be a supplementary justification for his position: 
It is important to be clear why the rehabilitative ideal is not acceptable as a 
purpose of punishment •..• After all, if we are sufficiently ruthless in the matter, 
we can coercively cure criminals. The risk of repetition of behavior troublesome 
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Another problem with Professor Morris' plan to expunge coer-
cion from rehabilitative programs stems from his belief that not 
only must the overt forms of coercion be eliminated, but the subtle 
as well. For example, he apparently feels that the mere "suggestion 
that a prisoner's release may be accelerated because of participation 
in such programs, [or] that it might be delayed or postponed be-
cause of failure to participate" (p. 18) could vitiate the effectiveness 
of these programs.13 It may not be possible, however, to eliminate 
the coercion that results from the "suggestion" that release and 
participation in rehabilitative programs may be linked, even if that 
suggestion is never officially articulated. This is so because the pris-
oners' perceptions may be distorted. As Professor Morris says: "Even 
when our prison purposes are indeed both benevolent and rehabili-
tative, there is no reason to assume they are so viewed and experi-
enced by the convicted offender" (p. 15). Thus, if prisoners will not 
believe that programs are "benevolent and rehabilitative" when 
they are, why should we expect them to believe the other side of the 
coin-that there will be no amelioration of the sentence (length or 
conditions) as a result of participation? They may flock to these pro-
grams in the belief, albeit mistaken, that doing so will curry favor 
with the administration, much as inmates flocked to chaplains when 
they were first introduced into prisons.14 The point is, of course, 
that if prisoners do not believe the programs are voluntary and that 
no amelioration of the sentence will result from participation, then 
the "coercion" that Professor Morris believes must be eliminated 
for these programs to be truly rehabilitative will remain. This may 
well prove to be an insurmountable problem. 
Still, Professor Morris appears to be on the right track. I£ 
to any society by any member of that society can be terminated by capital pun-
ishment, by banishment, or by protracted imprisonment. Nor need that impris• 
onment be for life; aging cures all but the most exceptional proclivities to vio• 
lent crime. The rejection of that model of treatment as a part of crime control 
flows not from lack of power or competence to influence tlie criminal's behavior 
but from historical evidence about the misuse of power and from more funda• 
mental views of the nature of man and his rights to freedom. These properly limit 
the power that we wish to accord the state over the individual. We do not suspect, 
we know, that such powers tend to be abused. 
(P. 26; emphasis original.) I must say, however, that this paragraph is mystifying, 
What Professor Morris has done, of course, is to switch horses in midstream, He is 
no longer discussing rehabilitation and the "curing" of criminals, at least not as any 
compos mentis rehabilitationist I know of would discuss it. One does not "cure" crim• 
inals through banishment and death. Furthermore, Professor Morris did not have to 
take this peculiar path. Rather than picking on rehabilitation, he should have pointed 
out that any practice that in the final analysis is predicated on coercive control 
can be abused and distorted; there is nothing unique about rehabilitation in this 
regard. 
13. Professor Morris does think that a prisoner ought to be compelled to partici• 
pate in a program up to the point where he can intelligently evaluate it (pp. 18·19). 
14. See H. BARNES &: N. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN Cru!IIINOLOGY 494 (3d ed. 1959), 
August 1975] Recent Books 1521 
recidivism rates are any indication, the coerced programs have been 
failures. In any case, if the coercion is removed a few prisoners may 
benefit, while the rest will be saved the effort of going through the 
meaningless ritual that often appears to characterize participation 
in these programs. This is, at least in part, what Professor Morris 
hopes to accomplish through the substitution of facilitated change 
for coerced cure. 
A necessary step toward removing coercion from rehabilitative 
programs is Professor Morris' suggestion that the first parole release 
date should be determined promptly at the beginning of an offender's 
sentence. Presently, most parole boards do not determine the first 
parole release date until late in the sentence; often, participation in 
prison programs is taken into account in determining the release 
date, and this has the tendency to coerce participation. Accordingly, 
Professor Morris points out that "[t]he link between release on 
parole and involvement in prison programs" (p. 35) can best be 
broken by making the prisoner aware of the date of his release at 
the beginning of his sentence-contingent only upon no major 
breach of prison discipline (p. 35). Once this has been accomplished, 
"the prisoner and the prison authorities could turn their attention 
to arranging an educational, training, or treatment program relating 
available services to the prisoner's felt needs" (p. 39). Furthermore, 
the system could then move toward achieving the second principal 
reform of the structuring of imprisonment proposed by Professor 
Morris: the "graduated testing of fitness for freedom" (p. 27). 
According to Professor Morris, a prisoner's ability to function in 
society ought to be developed and tested by prison programs rather 
than simply estimated. He suggests that a complex of partial release 
programs be developed, ranging from short furloughs to prerelease 
hostel placements. These programs would be designed to decrease the 
chance of future criminality by allowing the prisoner to rebuild his 
self-confidence, reestablish invaluable family and social ties, and per-
haps, obtain a job.15 
In short, the unifying thread of Professor Morris' treatment of 
the structuring of imprisonment is a concern with maintaining the 
deterrent and retributive aspects of the penal system, while con-
currently maximizing the rehabilitative aspects of the programs 
15. Professor Morris is not adverse to imposing conditions on parole, which is an 
extension of the concept of graduated testing, so long as the conditions are imposed 
as a result of anamnestic predictions (pp. 39, 42-43). If we know that certain influences 
are highly correlated with criminal activity on the part of a particular prisoner, 
requiring him to avoid these influences may decrease the chance of future criminality. 
If he cannot avoid them, then the chance of future criminality is sufficiently high to 
lock him up for a little ameliorative aging. Actually, Professor Morris does not address 
the question of enforcing the parole conditions, but there is little choice other than 
parole revocation. For a more troublesome problem see note 44 infra. 
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presently administered. Although at points I have quibbled with 
him,16 in the main his proposals appear sound, commendably hu-
mane, and very likely to lead to improvement if implemented. 
II. THE JUSTIFICATION OF IMPRISONMENT 
Professor Morris' major contribution to traditional jurisprudence 
is his presentation of principles to guide the distribution of im-
prisonment. He does not attempt to justify the practice of impris-
onment itself;17 instead, he assumes it is justifiable on the basis of 
retribution and deterrence (p. 58), although he neither clarifies 
what he means by retribution18 nor examines the mechanics of 
deterrence. His failure to discuss the problems of justification and 
retribution is in fact refreshing; notwithstanding the fame of these 
issues in the history of the philosophy of law, "perhaps they are 
not so important as the amount of time and ink expended upon them 
suggests."19 However, his failure to discuss deterrence more fully is 
troublesome, for if it is the case that the primary deterrent to the 
commission of criminal acts is a desire to comply with the commu-
nity's shared norms20 (rather than, for example, the fear of un-
pleasant consequences),21 then it seems futile for Morris to discuss 
the principles of imprisonment under the rubric of deterrence with-
out also discussing the substantive criminal law. In short, one must 
come to Professor Morris' discussion of the distribution of impris-
onment willing to "cut through the rhetorical foliage that charac-
terizes most jurisprudential discussion of the purposes of punish-
ment" (p. 58) by disregarding the substantive criminal law, disposing 
16. One might quibble over other things as well, such as his use of quick and 
overly sharp characterizations. On page 29, for example, he labels some potential 
criticisms of his work "nihilistic anxieties," which is less than enlightening. I also 
doubt whether he really believes that all other work in the area has reflected either 
"mindless reliance on the prison," or "boundless confidence in the enforceability of 
the Sermon on the Mount" (p. 3). Many of the works he cites in his excellent 
collection of source materials (pp. 123-36) disprove the validity of such a character-
ization, and surely Professor Morris realizes this. Perhaps the only criticism that can 
be directed at his reference list is that it lacks historical perspective on many issues. 
Professor Stolz has said of the field of legal education that "[a]rticles could be lifted 
out of the Law School News of 1915 and passed off today as tolerably fresh ideas," 
Stolz, Training for the Public Profession of the Law (1921): A Contemporary Review, 
in H. PACKER & T. ERLICH, NEW DIREC'I10NS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 227, 228 (1972); the 
same may be said here. 
17. For a discussion of the general justifying aim/distribution dichotomy see 
H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 8-13 (1968). 
18. For an examination of the concept of retribution see Griffiths, supra note 2, 
at 1418-21. 
19. H. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 2 (1963). 
20. See J. BENTHAllf, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 272 (R. Hildreth trans. 1864). 
21. See J. ANDENAES, supra note 8, at 35. 
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of the general justifying aim of punishment by ipse dixit, and 
ignoring the question of severity.22 
The essence of Morris' proposal is simple: upon an acceptable 
conviction,23 any sentence imposed must be necessary to achieve 
defined social purposes and should be limited by a retributive 
maximum. Imprisonment is not justified unless a lesser punishment 
would depreciate the seriousness of the crime, or would not satisfy 
socially justified deterrent purposes, or has been recently or fre-
quently applied to the offender (pp. 59-60). Finally, Professor Morris 
believes that predictions of future criminality ("dangeroumess") 
cannot justify imprisonment, although predictions based on a pris-
oner's anamnesis may justify other restrictions, such as conditional 
sentencing. 24 
For the most part, Professor Morris' proposal is sound. Two of 
its components, however, seem troublesome and demand attention.25 
First, it is difficult to understand why a sentence of imprisonment 
should be mandated when "other less restrictive sanctions have been 
frequently or recently applied to [the] offender" (p. 60). Second, it 
is not at all clear why predictions of "dangerous" criminal behavior 
("crimes of some gravity" (p. 34)) cannot justify the decision to im-
prison (pp. 59-60). 
As to the first issue, Professor Morris has said: "[T]here must be 
a role for the residual penal sanction, imprisonment, if the lesser 
sanctions have been appropriately applied and contumaciously ig-
nored and the offender comes yet again for punishment" (p. 79). 
Why imprisonment should serve as a "residual penal sanction" es-
capes me, however, particularly in light of Professor Morris' state-
ment that such punishment is necessary because the "criminal law 
must keep its retributive promises" (pp. 79-80). If there is no 
retributive promise demanding imprisonment for a certain offense 
22. Morris passes over the question of severity, isolating the issue of "imprison-
ment vel non" to facilitate exposition (p. 59). To do so he assumes that imprisonment 
is more severe than any other usable sanction (p. 59). 
23. In Morris' view, most convictions today are not acceptable because of the 
abuses of plea bargaining (pp. 46, 50-57). For a contrary view see Enker, Perspectives 
on Plea Bargaining, in U.S. TASK FORCE ON nm ADllfiNISTRATION OF JusnCE, PRESIDENT'S 
COMl\lN. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusnCE, TASK FORCE REPORT: 
THE COURTS 108 (1969). 
24. See note 15 supra. 
25. Of course, Professor Morris' lack of discussion of a number of issues may also 
trouble the reader. For example, he does not explain how "social purposes" are to 
be defined, how potentially conflicting social purposes are to be reconciled, how one 
ascertains the punishment that will have the optimum deterrent effect, or whether 
it is possible to determine the "objective gravity of [a] crime" (p. 74) (although with 
regard to this last question, he does say: "Desert is, of course, not precisely quanti-
fiable • • • • [V]iews of the proper maximums of retributive punishments differ dra-
matically between countries, between cultures and subcultural groups, and in all 
countries over time" (pp. 75-76)). 
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-if the offense falls below that level of severity where "any lesser 
punishment would depreciate the seriousness of the crime" (p. 60)-
then why should the mere repetition of the offense justify imprison-
ment? Presumably, whatever retributive impulses were generated by 
the commission of the earlier offense were satisfied by the sanction 
imposed. 
Of course, one might conclude that repetitive criminality itself 
gives rise to retributive impulses, separate from those stemming 
from the individual acts committed-that "the sum is greater than 
its parts." A society insufficiently outraged by a particular act to 
imprison the actor may become sufficiently outraged by the actor's 
commission of a subsequent similar act to justify imprisoning him, 
notwithstanding the fact that the retributive impulses generated by 
the earlier act had been satisfied. Whether or not this is what Pro-
fessor Morris had in mind cannot be ascertained from his book, 
unfortunately, since he did not expand upon his cryptic comment 
that "the criminal law must keep its retributive promises." 
If this is Professor Morris' justification for imprisoning the 
recidivist petty offender, however, he has taken a position that is 
inconsistent with the remainder of his scheme. Because of his posi-
tion on the prediction of future criminality, Professor Morris rejects 
the notion of using considerations of "special deterrence" in the 
sentencing process; that is, he refuses to punish the multiple offender 
more severely for the specific purpose of deterring him from commit-
ting future offenses. But, since the residual penal sanction is not to 
be invoked unless "the lesser sanctions have been ... contumaciously 
ignored," it is obviously directed to the case where a sanction has 
failed to deter an individual from committing subsequent criminal 
acts. Thus, if the "rhetorical foliage" is pierced, the essence of the 
proposal is to allow increasing punishments until an offender no 
longer offends. In short, while Professor Morris has publicly barred 
his front door to specific deterrence, he has surreptitiously slipped 
the bolt on the rear entrance.26 
The second issue demanding attention-Professor Morris' prin-
ciple that prediction of dangerous criminality is an unjust basis for 
imposing imprisonment-is troublesome for two reasons: the statis-
tical studies Morris relies upon to justify his principle are open to 
differing interpretations and, more importantly, he inadequately 
addresses the possibility that our ability to predict criminality will 
improve. 
26. There is yet another possible justification for Professor Morris' proposal. Repe• 
titious criminality can itself be viewed as an "offense" that must be deterred, Thus, 
under principles of general deterrence, imprisonment might be the appropriate sanc-
tion to apply to persons who plan a "life of crime." However, predictive problems 
arise under this theory as well. For example, how can a system that cannot make 
predictions of criminality determine who has planned a life of crime? 
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Professor Morris makes much of the aftermath of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Baxstrom v. Herold.21 The Court in that case 
held that New York Correction Law§ 38428 violated the equal pro-
tection clause by authorizing a person to "be civilly committed at 
the expiration of his penal sentence without the jury review available 
to all other persons civilly committed in New York."29 As a direct 
result of Baxstrom, 967 patients formerly held by the New York 
Department of Corrections in Dannemora and Matteawan State 
Hospitals were transferred to civil hospitals or released. 
Under Professor Morris' interpretation, New York's defective 
statutory scheme had resulted in prisoners being "held in [Danne-
mora and Matteawan] beyond the term of their sentence if, after 
psychiatric examination, they were deemed mentally ill and dan-
gerous to themselves or others" (p. 69). Thus, according to Professor 
Morris, "the Supreme Court ... compelled the testing of our pre-
dictions of violence, and the test revealed massive overprediction" 
(p. 70)-only 2 per cent of a sample of 246 patients released or 
transferred from Dannemora were returned to institutions for the 
criminally insane, only 19.6 per cent of the males and 25.5 per cent 
of the females demonstrated assaultive behavior in civil hospitals, 
and, most striking of all, "56% of the males and 43% of the females 
. . . had no subsequent readmission to mental hospitals during the 
four years of follow-up" (p. 70). From these impressive figures Pro-
fessor Morris concludes that we lack predictive capacity; but closer 
analysis is warranted, for he may be wrong in his characterization 
of the statutory scheme, and the figures he presents are subject to 
another interpretation. 
In 1961, the year Johnny Baxstrom was sent to Dannemora, if 
a physician or psychiatrist was of the opinion that an inmate was 
"insane,"30 New York law provided that the inmate could be trans-
ferred to Dannemora and retained there "until legally discharged."31 
If the Director of Dannemora was of the opinion that the insanity 
persisted, he could apply for certification of the inmate within 30 
days of the expiration of the inmate's term. The prisoner would be 
certified if the court was convinced "that such person may require 
27. 383 U.S. 107 (1966). 
28. This section has since been repealed. See Law of July 29, 1966, ch. 891, § I, 
[1966] N.Y. Laws 1880. 
29. 383 U.S. at 110. 
30. "Insane" was defined as having "equal significance to th~ words 'mentally ill,' " 
Law of April 14, 1946, ch. 751, § 2(15), [1946] N.Y. Laws 1468 (repealed 1972), and 
a "mentally ill person" was simply one "afflicted with mental disease to such an extent 
that for his own welfare or the welfare of others, or of the community, he requires 
care and treatment." Law of April 14, 1946 ch. 751, § 2(8), [1946] N.Y. Laws (repealed 
1972). 
31. Law of April 8, 1933, ch. 150, § I, [1933] N.Y. Laws 549 (repealed 1962). 
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care and treatment in an institution for the mentally ill .... "82 
Upon such a :finding the prisoner was placed "in an appropriate 
state institution of the department of mental hygiene or of the 
department of correction as may be designated . . . by agreement 
benV'een the heads of the two departments.''83 
Thus, the law did not require that a predisposition to violence 
be shown prior to an inmate's certification, nor was the word 
"dangerous" anywhere used; once it was determined that a prisoner 
might "require care and treatment in an institution for the men-
tally ill," the place of confinement was a matter of administrative 
discretion. In fact, prisoners were the only persons who could be 
civilly committed to Dannemora without a "judicial determination 
that [they were] dangerously mentally ill,''34-this was the second 
justification the Supreme Court gave for its holding in Baxstrom. 
Baxstrom himself is proof that administrative discretion, not pre-
dictions of dangerousness, determined placement upon the expira-
tion of a prison term: "[T]he administrative decision to retain Ba.."C-
strom in Dannemora ... was made despite the othenV'ise unanimous 
conclusion by testifying psychiatrists, including an independent 
examining psychiatrist and [the Assistant Director of Dannemora], 
that there was no reason why Baxstrom could not be transferred to 
a civil institution. "35 One must therefore take with a grain of salt 
Professor Morris' statement that "[i]t is important to remember that 
all of the Baxstrom patients were convicted criminals being held as 
likely to be dangerous if released" (p. 69). While some, perhaps most, 
of the patients were held on the basis of "dangerousness," this was 
certainly not true of them all. 
Furthermore, Professor Morris' use of the Baxstrom studies86 to 
demonstrate our lack of capacity validly to predict dangerous be-
havior is of questionable value. Consider the figure he quotes that 
56 per cent of the males and 43 per cent of the females in the 
sample studied had no subsequent readmission to mental hospitals 
during the follow-up period. While this is an impressive figure, what 
it obscures is more impressive than what it reveals-that of the 246 
patients studied, 125 were not released within the four-year follow-
up period37 and could not, obviously, be "readmitted.'' Thus, another 
32. Law of April 8, 1933, ch. 150, § 1, [1933] N.Y. Laws 549 (repealed 1962). 
33. Law of April 8, 1933, ch. 150, § 1, [1933] N.Y. Laws 549 (repealed 1962). 
34. 383 U.S. at U0. 
35. 383 U.S. at ll2 n.3. 
36. Professor Morris has relied on the work of Steadman and his associates for 
his information. See Steadman &: Halfon, The Baxstrom Patients: Bacligrounds and 
Outcomes, 3 SEMINARS IN PSYCHIATRY 376 (1971); Steadman 8: Keveles, The Community 
Adjustment and Criminal Activity of the Baxstrom Patients: 1966-1970, 129 AM, J. 
PSYCHIATRY 304 (1972). 
37. Steadman &: Halfon, supra note 36, at 382. 
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way of characterizing this data is to say that 49 per cent of the pa-
tients were never released from custody and 75 per cent of them 
were under state control at some point during the four-year follow-up. 
Furthermore, of the 25 per cent who were not subsequently re-
admitted, it was not known how many had died.38 
Consider as well the fascinating figure, also relied on by Professor 
Morris, that only 13 of the 84 released patients for whom there was 
adequate follow-up had criminal contacts with the police. This fails 
to disclose that a "criminal contact" was defined "as one in which 
an arrest was made and charges pressed .... "39 Thus, Professor 
Morris' presentation does not reflect the fact that there were 21 
arrests without conviction where "rehospitalization was without ex-
ception the alternative to trial"40 and "23 noncriminal police con-
tacts by 19 patients."41 In short, the figures Professor Morris focuses 
on do not accurately reflect the subsequent behavior of Baxstrom 
patients, their interaction with the police, or their criminality. 
Furthermore, these figures only reflect the number of ex-patients 
caught, not the number actually committing an arguably criminal 
act-a distinction Professor Morris made while discussing parole 
predictions (p. 72), but did not make here. 
Finally, there is one point that is altogether absent from Professor 
Morris' discussion-the age profile of the sample. As Professor 
Morris points out elsewhere: "Virtually all criminals can have their 
subsequent violent crime dramatically reduced by detaining them in 
prison until their :fiftieth birthdays" (p. 80). As of December 1970, 
the surviving males in the Baxstrom sample had a mean age of 49.8 
years; the surviving females had a mean age of 51.9 years. "In sum, 
we are dealing with an older middle-aged population,"42 and since 
members of such populations do not often engage in violent or 
assaultive behavior, it should not be surprising that the Baxstrom 
patients failed to do so. 
While I do not wish to suggest that we presently have an accurate 
predictive ability, the figures Professor Morris uses neither prove 
that such ability does not exist nor that it could not be developed.43 
38. Id. at 381. 
39. Id. at 383. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 378. 
43. Professor Morris also relies on Kozol, Boucher 8: Garafalo, The Diagnosis and 
Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME 8: DELINQUENCY 371 (1972). An analysis of 
Morris' reliance on this study could also be done, but the point has, I believe, been 
made. Morris recognizes some of the weaknesses of his reliance on this study (p. 72) 
but fails to mention others. The authors themselves concluded that "[it] appears that 
dangerousness can be reliably diagnosed and effectively treated." Id. at 392. For the 
contrary view with regard to diagnosis see Ennis 8: Litwack, Psychiatry and the Pre• 
sumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693 (1974). 
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Certainly the empiricism he presents is not the sort upon which 
unqualified "principles" ought to be implemented, yet he seems to 
hang an important principle on this empirical peg: "[A]s a matter of 
justice we should never take power over the convicted criminal on 
the basis of unreliable predictions of his dangerousness" (p. 73; 
emphasis original).44 
Professor Morris does not rely entirely on empiricism, however, 
for he proceeds to supplement this rather dubious empirical argu-
ment with an even more questionable assertion: "[N]ot only lack of 
knowledge forces us to hesitate to impose dramatic or Draconian 
'cures' on criminals; basic views of the minimum freedoms and 
dignities rightfully accorded human beings stay our punitive hands" 
(p. 83). Had he relied solely on empiricism, I would have little 
trouble with his argument. While one might disagree, for example, 
·with the assertion that, based on a prediction of violent criminality 
with a probability of validity of thirty per cent, a convicted offender 
ought not to be preventively detained, at least the argument is clear. 
When that argument is abandoned for one based on "minimum free-
doms and dignities rightfully accorded human beings," my discontent 
no longer stems merely from disagreement over the weight to be 
given certain empirical data, for Professor Morris and I have reached 
a qualitative impasse. 
Consider the simplest case-a mad scientist who is convicted of a 
crime and for whom a valid prediction is made that if released he will 
blow up the world. While this may seem absurd, it would be just as 
absurd to let our hypothetical Dr. Strangelove loose to hatch his 
scheme based upon the "minimum freedoms and dignities rightfully 
accorded human beings."45 
The conclusion of the Kozol study is not unqualified, however: "It is clear that we 
must improve our diagnostic and therapeutic competence to insure that fewer dan-
gerous persons are let out and fewer nondangerous persons are kept in." Kozol, 
Boucher, & Garafolo, supra, at 392. 
44. Curiously, Professor Morris rejects anamnestic predictions here as well, not-
withstanding that he would allow such predictions to affect conditions of parole. See 
note 15 supra. How these two positions can be reconciled is not clear, as both entail 
restricting freedom on the basis of predictions of future criminality. Furthermore, 
Morris does not attempt a reconciliation (see p. 66). 
45. It would be just as absurd, of course, to let him go if he bad not been con-
victed of another crime; much of the confusion that permeates Professor Morris' dis-
cussion of predictions of dangerousness results from his failure to recognize this, 
Quite simply, predictions of dangerousness are not relevant to the punishment an 
offender receives when the appropriateness of the sanction is determined (as Professor 
Morris would determine it) by principles of retribution and general deterrence. Ret-
ribution, whether what is meant be revenge, retaliation or expiation, relates punish-
ment to the act done (or the act and its consequences), while general deterrence is 
concerned only with the effect on the rest of society of punishing one person for 
what he has done, or what the rest of society can be convinced he has done. Pro• 
fessor Morris need have gone no further, it seems to me, than embrace retribution 
and general deterrence as the justifications of punishment to exclude predictions of 
dangerousness from the determination of the proper sentence, 
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Rather than rest on absurdity, however, let us move toward 
reality: Consider the case of an offender convicted for murder for 
whom a prediction is made that if released at that point in time 
at which retribution and general deterrence are satisfied, he will, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, kill again. In other words, assume that 
our predictive ability has improved to the same level of certainty 
as that required for a criminal conviction,46 and that the same 
question of preventive detention is posed. Surely at this point 
Professor Morris would not take his objection to "unreliable pre-
dictions of ... dangerousness" (p. 73) beyond its logical boundaries 
by arguing that the margin of error contained in the "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard mandates that our murderer be released. 
I£ so, the same logic could be applied to determinations of prior 
criminality to vitiate criminal trials. In other words, while the 
determination that something has happened in the past or is about 
to happen in the future may be impossible to make with 100 per cent 
probability of validity,47 at some point a high probability of a phe-
nomenon's occurrence must enable us to act on the assumption that 
it has occurred or will occur.48 The question must then be faced 
whether there is a notion of "justice" that demands this hypothetical 
killer be released; if so, I cannot find it. Whatever loss results to the 
offender is more than offset by the elimination of the strong proba-
bility of a future murder. 
But, hypotheticals can be changed; my murderer could be trans-
formed into your illegal expectorator, and the same questions posed. 
If faced with a prediction that, beyond a reasonable doubt, an of-
fender convicted of illegal expectoration ·will offend once more if 
released at that point in time at which general deterrence and retri-
bution are satisfied, what result? Certainly he should not be locked 
up until his salivary glands wither away. But, why not? Obviously, 
expectorating may not be a serious enough societal harm ever to 
justify imprisonment. But, were there circumstances under which 
imprisonment could be justified, given the nature of the crime, we 
might feel more at ease utilizing a standard of predictive validity 
46. It is easier to state this standard than to define it. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 369-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
47. For interesting discussions of this point see Kaplan, Decision Theory and the 
Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065 (1968); Dershowitz, Preventive Detention: 
Social Threat, TRIAL, Dec.-Jan., 1969-1970, at 22. 
48. The California supreme court recently demonstrated sufficient confidence in 
predictions of dangerousness to hold that psychiatrists had a duty to warn a person 
of threats made on his life by a patient with violent tendencies. Tarasoff v. Regents 
of Univ. of California, - Cal. 3d -, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129, 529 P.2d 553 (1974). "[A] 
patient with severe mental illness and dangerous proclivities may, in a given case, 
present a danger as serious and as foreseeable as does the carrier of a contagious 
disease or the driver whose condition or medication affects his ability to drive safely." 
- Cal. 3d at-, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 135, 529 P.2d at 559. 
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more stringent than that of "beyond a reasonable doubt." As the 
gap between "beyond a reasonable doubt" and certainty begins to 
narrow, the reluctance to detain expectorators preventively may 
diminish proportionately. In other words, the use of preventive 
detention may mandate a sliding scale that balances the societal 
values to be protected and the accuracy of the predictions involved.40 
In any case, the issue is much more complex than Professor Morris' 
analysis would suggest. As the predictions upon which preventive 
detention and other coercive techniques are based improve, and thus 
the empirical hiding place Professor Morris has relied upon dis-
sipates, more will be required to dispose of these problems than to 
assert, "they violate justice." A careful analysis of the costs and bene-
fits would be a good starting point, but one that Professor Morris 
unfortunately chose to ignore. 50 
III. THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 
Professor Morris has attempted to accomplish several difficult 
tasks in his new book. Most notably he has attempted to predict the 
future, and influence the development, of a stagnant social institu-
tion. Only time will tell if he has achieved either of these goals, just 
as only time will tell the ultimate worth of his attempt to rationalize 
the distribution of imprisonment. 
49. For an interesting essay on the problems of preventive detention see Dersho, 
witz, On Preventive Detention, N.Y. REv. Bo01ts, March 13, 1969, at 22. 
50. Professor Morris concludes this section with one final argument: "If criminals, 
if the mentally ill or the retarded are subjected to coercive control beyond that jus, 
tified by the past injuries they have inflicted, then why not you, and certainly me? 
We find ourselves in the business of remaking man, and that is beyond our compe-
tence; it is an empyrean rather than an earthly task" (p. 84). Still, I am not con-
vinced. First, I take it that Morris is bound by his own parameters, and the issue 
of an improper substantive criminal law is not before us. That "you, and certainly 
me" will not be subjected to any sanction unless convicted of a criminal act must be 
assumed, in other words, to enable us to deal with the propriety of any particular 
sanction. Second, in one very real sense all law is an attempt to remake man and 
thus "an empyrean rather than earthly task.'' If certain coercive sanctions are only 
quantitatively different from others, i.e., 100 per cent effective, then it is paradoxical 
to disallow them solely because they achieve their objective. Moreover, whether these 
sanctions are qualitatively different involves a question whose answer must ultimately 
rest on faith. There is no qualitative difference between psychosu'rgery, when its only 
effect on an inveterate thief is to inhibit his thievery completely, and a criminal 
sanction that has the same effect on another. If, on the other hand, the second thief 
could have chosen to take the risk and continue thieving, but chose othenvise, then 
a qualitative difference appears. In other words, if psychosurgery were sufficiently 
advanced so as to affect only the ability to commit a prohibited act, whether it would 
differ qualitatively from a penal threat would be a function of the existence of free will. 
Nor does Morris' discussion of J. R.Awts, A THEORY OF JurnCE (1971), yield much, 
He concludes by saying: ''[W]e would • • • subscribe to concepts of fairness and 
justice that preclude the sacrifice of the individual prisoner to a supposed larger 
social good" (p. 83). Suffice it to say that how this statement can be reconciled with 
Professor Morris' reliance on general deterrence-the paradigm case of sacrificing an 
individual to a "supposed larger social good" (see I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
194-98 (Hastie transl. 1887))-escapes me. 
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Although at many points the book suffers from Professor Morris' 
preoccupation with style rather than substance, nonetheless it is a work 
well worth reading. In his attempt to reconcile the brutality of crime 
with the brutal treatment society has accorded its criminals, Pro-
fessor Morris has raised some of the fundamental questions facing 
our society. The book is an enlightening glimpse of one very humane 
man as he attempts to reconcile his humanity with the need he sees 
to occasionally inflict punishment on another.51 
Ronald ]. Allen 
Assistant Professor of Law 
State University of New York 
at Buffalo 
51. I have not dealt with chapter 4, "A Prison for Repetitively Violent Criminals," 
which "is a sketch of how already recommended principles of imprisonment might 
promptly be applied to, and tested on, a defined group of prisoners" (p. 86). Although 
in many ways this is the most interesting part of the book, I have not reviewed it 
because Professor Morris says that a much more complete research design is available 
for the "interested scholar or administrator" (p. 117). I wrote Professor Morris for 
the design on Dec. 20, 1974, and have yet to receive it. Since the plan is ostensibly 
much more complete than the chapter, I prefer postponing consideration of this 
model prison until I can view the work in its entirety. 
